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Abstract. Because interlocking systems are highly safety-critical com-
plex systems, their automated safety verification is an active research
topic investigated by several groups, employing verification techniques to
produce important cost and time savings in their certification. However,
such systems also pose a big challenge to current verification method-
ologies, due to the explosion of state space size as soon as large, if not
medium sized, multi-station systems have to be controlled.
For these reasons, verification techniques that exploit locality principles
related to the topological layout of the controlled system to split in dif-
ferent ways the state space have been investigated. In particular, com-
positional approaches divide the controlled track network in regions that
can be verified separately, once proper assumptions are considered on
the way the pieces are glued together.
Basing on a successful method to verify the size of rather large net-
works, we propose a compositional approach that is particularly suitable
to address multi-station interlocking systems which control a whole line
composed of stations linked by mainline tracks. Indeed, it turns out that
for such networks, and for the adopted verification approach, the verifi-
cation effort amounts just to the sum of the verification efforts for each
intermediate station and for each connecting line.
1 Introduction
An interlocking system is responsible for guiding trains safely through a given
railway network. It is a vital part of any railway signalling system and has the
highest safety integrity level (SIL4) according to the CENELEC 50128 standard
[1]. Automated safety verification of interlocking systems is hence an important
issue and an active research topic, investigated by several research groups, see
e.g., [3,4,5,9,21]. Model-checking techniques are considered for this purpose, but,
notwithstanding the important advancements witnessed for these techniques,
they fail to give results on large interlocking systems due to the state space
explosion problem.
In this paper we elaborate on previous results of the RobustRailS research
project3, in which an automatic method for the formal verification of interlocking
3 In Denmark, in the years 2009-2021, new interlocking systems that are compatible
with the standardised European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2 [2] will be de-
systems was developed [18,19,20]. Using a combination of SMT based bounded
model checking (BMC) and inductive reasoning, the method succeeded to verify
interlocking systems of large sizes. Indeed, in a comparison with other model
checkers, the proposed method succeeded to verify a multi-station interlocking
controlling a whole line, while the other tools failed to conclude the verification
with the given time and resources available. Nevertheless, the verification of
the considered systems just reached the limits of time and memory showing
that larger systems cannot be addressed any more, and hence these verification
methods need to be further improved.
Interlocking systems typically exhibit a high degree of locality : if we consider
a typical safety property desired for an interlocking system, e.g. that the same
track element shall not be reserved by more than one train at a time, it is likely
that this property is not influenced by a train moving on a distant, or parallel,
track element. Locality of a safety property can be exploited for verification pur-
poses, by limiting the state space on which to verify it.
This principle has been exploited in [22] to define domain-oriented optimizations
of the variable ordering in a BDD-based verification. Locality can be used also
for slicing, as suggested in [3] and [10,8]. The idea is to consider only the portion
of the model that has influence on the property to be verified, by a topological
selection of interested track elements (therefore closely related to the cone of
influence of the property): this allows for a much more efficient verification of
the single property, but comes at the price of repeating the verification for every
property (in principle a single verification of the conjunction of all safety prop-
erties on the whole model would otherwise suffice), and of separately checking
that verifying slices does actually imply the satisfaction of desired properties for
the whole system. Nevertheless, it appears that when automated, this process
can offer significant time and memory savings.
A compositional approach that also exploits locality is the one used in [11],
where the interlocking of a quasi-symmetrical station is divided in two halves,
and the verification of one half takes into account assume/guarantee conditions
at the interface with the other half. The verification effort is hence repeated for
the two halves, with the extra effort of proving that assume/guarantee conditions
do hold at the interface: locality allows such conditions to be rather simple so
that they do not add much time to the verification.
In this paper we adopt a similar compositional approach to chop a large
interlocking system into smaller fragments, but by considering a different way
of dividing the network in fragments. The presented approach is particularly
suitable to address multi-station interlocking systems, which control a whole
line composed of stations linked by mainline tracks. Indeed, it turns out that for
such networks, and for the adopted verification approach, the verification effort
amounts just to the sum of verification efforts for each intermediate station and
for each connecting line. Since in reality the intermediate stations often share
ployed in the entire country within the context of the Danish Signalling Programme.
In the context of the RobustRailS project accompanying the signalling programme
on a scientific level, the proposed method will be applied to these new systems.
an identical layout, the gain in verification is made even larger by factoring out
the identical stations.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 2 we present the verification
approach on which we have built our compositional approach; in Sect. 3 we show
how a network can be divided in smaller fragments, and how the verification of
the whole network is obtained from the verification of the single elements, using
as running example a simple network. In Sect. 4 we report on the results given
by the application of our decomposition approach to a small example and to
the EDL line that nearly reached the capacity bounds of the adopted tools
when proved as a whole. In both cases the results show significant gains in
verification effort can be achieved. Sect. 5 summarizes the achieved results and
discusses possible future extensions and improvements of the work presented
here, especially in the direction of addressing interlocking systems that control
large stations.
2 The new Danish Route-based Interlocking Systems
In this section we introduce briefly the new Danish interlocking systems and the
domain terminology. The subsequent subsections explain (2.1) different com-
ponents of a specification of an interlocking system which is compatible with
ERTMS/ETCS Level 2 [2], and (2.2) how the safety properties are verified, re-
spectively.
2.1 Specification of Interlocking Systems
The specification of a given route-based interlocking system consists of two main
components: (1) a railway network, and (2) a corresponding interlocking table.
Railway Networks A railway network in ETCS Level 2 consists of a number
of track and track-side elements of different types4: linear sections, points, and
marker boards. Figure 1 shows an example layout of a railway network having
six linear sections (b10,t10,t12,t14,t20,b14), two points (t11,t13), and eight
marker boards (mb10, . . . , mb21). These terms, and their functionality within
the railway network, will be explained in more detail in the next paragraphs.
t10 t14t13t12
mb10 mb14mb13
mb12mb11 mb15
t20
mb21
mb20
t11
UPDOWN
b10 b14
Fig. 1: An example railway network layout.
4 Here we only show types that are relevant for the work presented in this article.
A linear section is a section with up to two neighbours: one in the up end,
and one in the down end. For example, the linear section t12 in Figure 1 has
t13 and t11 as neighbours at its up end and down end, respectively. In Danish
railway’s terminology, up and down denote the directions in which the distance
from a reference location is increasing and decreasing, respectively. The reference
location is the same for both up and down, e.g., an end of a line. For simplicity,
in the examples and figures in the rest of this article, the up (down) direction is
assumed to be the left-to-right (right-to-left) direction.
A point can have up to three neighbours: one at the stem, one at the plus
end, and one at the minus end, e.g., point t11 in Figure 1 has t10, t12, and
t20 as neighbours at its stem, plus, and minus ends, respectively. The ends of a
point are named so that the stem and plus ends form the straight (main) path,
and the stem and minus ends form the branching (siding) path. A point can
be switched between two positions: PLUS and MINUS. When a point is in the
PLUS (MINUS) position, its stem end is connected to its plus (minus) end, thus
traffic can run from its stem end to its plus (minus) end and vice versa. It is not
possible for traffic to run from plus end to minus end and vice versa.
Linear sections and points are collectively called (train detection) sections,
as they are provided with train detection equipment used by the interlocking
system to detect the presence of trains. Note that sections are bidirectional, i.e.,
trains are allowed to travel in both directions (but not at the same time).
Along each linear section, up to two marker boards (one for each direction)
can be installed. A marker board can only be seen in one direction and is used
as reference location (for the start and end of routes) for trains going in that
direction. For example, in Figure 1, marker board mb13 is installed along section
t12 for travel direction up. Contrary to legacy systems, there are no physical sig-
nals in ETCS Level 2, but interlocking systems have a virtual signal associated
with each marker board. Virtual signals play a similar role as physical signals in
legacy systems: a virtual signal can be OPEN or CLOSED, respectively, allowing
or disallowing traffic to pass the associated marker board. However, trains (more
precisely train drivers) do not see the virtual signals, as opposed to physical
signals. Instead, the aspect of virtual signals (OPEN or CLOSED) is communi-
cated to the onboard computer in the train via a radio network. For simplicity,
the terms virtual signals, signals, and marker boards are used interchangeably
throughout this paper.
Interlocking Tables An interlocking system monitors constantly the status of
track-side elements, and sets them to appropriate states in order to allow trains
traveling safely through the railway network under control. The new Danish
interlocking systems are route-based. A route is a path from a source signal to a
destination signal in the given railway network. A route is called an elementary
route if there are no signals that are located between its source signal and its
destination signal, and that are intended for the same direction as the route.
In railway signalling terminology, setting a route denotes the process of allo-
cating the resources – i.e., sections, points, and signals – for the route, and then
locking it exclusively for only one train when the resources are allocated.
An interlocking table specifies the elementary routes in the given railway
network and the conditions for setting these routes. The specification of a route
r and conditions for setting r include the following information:
– src(r) – the source signal of r,
– dst(r) – the destination signal of r,
– path(r) – the list of sections constituting r’s path from src(r) to dst(r),
– overlap(r) – a list of the sections in r’s overlap5, i.e., the buffer space after
dst(r) that would be used in case trains overshoot the route’s path,
– points(r) – a map from points6 used by r to their required positions,
– signals(r) – a set of protecting signals used for flank or front protection [15]
for the route, and
– conflicts(r) – a set of conflicting routes which must not be set while r is set.
that is needed while verifying the expected properties.
2.2 The RobustRailS Verification Approach and Toolkit
This section describes shortly the RobustRailS verification method and tool set
that we use as verification technology. For detailed information, see [17,18,19,20].
The method for modelling and verifying railway interlocking systems is a
combination of formal methods and a domain-specific language (DSL) to express
network diagrams and interlocking tables. According to this, an environment
consisting of the following components is provided.
– An editor and static checker [6] for editing and checking that a DSL speci-
fication (describing an interlocking system) follows certain well-formedness
rules.
– The bounded model checker of RT-Tester [12,16] which we use for making
k-induction proofs as described in [20].
– Generators transforming a DSL specification into inputs to the model checker:
• a behavioural model of the interlocking system and its environment, and
• the required safety properties given as linear temporal logic formulae.
The tools can be used to verify the design of an interlocking system in the
following steps:
1. A DSL specification of the configuration data (a network layout and its
corresponding interlocking table) is constructed in the following order:
(a) first the network layout,
5 An overlap section is needed when, for the short distance of a marker board to the
end of the section, there is the concrete danger that a braking train stops after the
end of the section, e.g. in adverse atmospheric conditions.
6 These points include points in the path and overlap, and points used for flank and
front protection. Sometimes it is required to protect tracks occupied by a train from
another train not succeeding to brake in due space. For details about flank and front
protection, see [15].
(b) and then the interlocking table (this is either done manually or generated
automatically from the network layout).
2. The static checker verifies whether the configuration data is statically well-
formed according to the static semantics [19] of the DSL.
3. The generators instantiate a generic behavioural model and generic safety
properties with the well-formed configuration data to generate the model
input of the model checker and the safety properties.
4. The generated model instance is then checked against the generated proper-
ties by the bounded model checker performing a k-induction proof.
The static checking in step (2) is intended to catch errors in the network layout
and interlocking table, while the model checking in step (4) is intended to catch
safety violations in the control algorithm of the instantiated model.
The toolchain associated with the method has been implemented using the
RT-tester framework [12,16]. The bounded model checker in RT-tester uses the
SONOLAR SMT solver [13] to compute counterexamples showing the violations
of the base case or induction step.
3 Method
We now proceed to describe the details of how we use the locality features of rail-
way networks to verify large interlocking systems in a compositional approach.
The idea is to decompose the networks in chunks that are separately verified for
safety properties, and to show how under given conditions such separate ver-
ifications are enough to guarantee that the whole network satisfies the safety
properties as well. We show that a multi-station interlocking system satisfies
such conditions if a suitable (and natural) divide strategy is applied. Indeed, the
strategy can be easily automated, providing a completely automated method to
verify this kind of interlocking systems.
3.1 Border assumptions
The approach of Sect. 2 is able to verify an interlocking system when immersed
in an environment that satisfies some assumptions on the borders of the system
network. The borders of the network (in the diagram of Figure 1, they are
partially dotted) are defined as track elements which are not under control of
the interlocking system for the network under consideration. Thus our method
assumes the following:
– assumptions on the network
1. the border elements include a marker board (signal), controlled by the
interlocking that protects the entrance to the network;
2. the routes of the network are elementary: start at one and end at another
of the marker boards of the network (including the border ones), and do
not include intermediate marker boards;
– assumptions on the trains’ behaviour
3. trains can “materialize” on a border element at any time, unless a train
has already materialized on it and has not yet moved away;
4. trains on a border track element can enter the network if they are allowed
to do (that is, if the border virtual entry signal is OPEN);
5. trains cannot enter in the middle of the network;
6. trains that pass from an adjacent track element to a border one can
“dematerialize” at any moment.
The assumptions on the status of the border track elements are an abstrac-
tion of the real environment in which the network is immersed: since the real
environment puts restrictions on the actual behaviour of trains (for example,
it introduces minimum time intervals between two incoming trains), these as-
sumptions give actually an over-approximation of its behaviour. Hence, if safety
is verified for every behaviour of the network and of its environment, it is verified
also in the case the environment is substituted by a more constrained behaviour,
which is the case when the network is connected to another one.
3.2 Divide strategy
We exploit the border assumptions to divide a network controlled by a single
interlocking into several sub-networks, each to be controlled by its own inter-
locking system, such that the verification of the original interlocking system can
be done by verifying the interlocking systems of the sub-networks. For the pur-
pose of this paper, we consider that a division produces two sub-networks (a
down and an up sub-network) by making one or several cuts each respecting the
conditions defined below:
A network cut satisfies the border cut conditions (BCCs) if:
1. it separates two consecutive linear sections such that in the joint between
the two there is an up markerboard on the upper part of the down section
and a down markerboard on the down part of the upper section;
2. no overlap section for the up sub-network includes elements in the down
sub-network, and vice-versa;
3. no flank/front protection requirement on the up sub-network depends on
elements of the down sub-network, and vice-versa.
The conditions above assure that the setting (reservation) of any route depends
only on the status of the elements belonging to one of the sub-networks.
A network with a cut (between the sections t14 and b14) satisfying the BCCs
is illustrated in Figure 2. In such a figure one can identify two sub-networks one
on the left-hand side and one on the right-hand side, thus allowing the monolithic
interlocking system controlling the whole network to be safely divided into two
interlocking systems controlling two networks.
Such a situation can be found when considering a multi-station interlocking,
which controls several stations on a line: the long sections of track between
two stations, according to the Danish signalling rules, do not carry over route
b15            b14 t14 
Subnet Down
               t13 
Subnet Up  
Fig. 2: A cut between sections t14 and b14 satisfies the border cut conditions.
information and present specific joints of the form described in Fig. 2, and are
hence natural places in which to cut the overall network.
In the division process a network is inspected in search for regions that
present candidate patterns to be cut, that is, joints of the form of Figure 2.
Once such a joint has been pointed out, the cut is operated forming two sub-
networks as illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4, where the down section of
the joint (t14) will be kept as the down border element of the Up sub-network,
and up section of the joint (b14) is kept as the up border element of the Down
sub-network. The search is then recursively applied to the created sub-networks,
until no more suitable cut points can be found.
     
b14 t14 
        
               t13 
Fig. 3: Resulting sub-network Down.
b15            b14 
   
t14 
        
Fig. 4: Resulting sub-network Up.
On more complex network layouts, our division process would require refine-
ments to cope with richer interfaces between the two sub-networks, that would
have, anyway, to respect the BCCs.
The concepts described above allow to automate the compositional verifi-
cation of multi-station interlocking systems by dividing the network in sub-
networks by means of a three steps algorithm:
1. Search the network for cuts satisfying the BCCs, and divide the network into
sub-networks.
2. For each of the resulting sub-networks, complete the specification of a sub-
interlocking system using the generator mentioned in item 1 of Sect. 2.2.
3. Verify a model of each sub-interlocking system by following the steps in
item 2, 3, and 4 of Sect. 2.2.
3.3 Soundness of the approach
Building upon the assumptions on the model and verification process we sketch
an induction argument for the soundness of the compositional approach focusing
on the case where we divide a network into two. First we prove that the resulting
sub-networks satisfy the required network assumptions 1 and 2. Then we argue
that the disjoint union of the interlocking tables generated for the sub-networks
constitute the whole interlocking table for the monolithic network. Then we pro-
ceed to guarantee that from the verification results of the local sub-interlocking
systems it is possible to infer the global verification result.
When dividing a monolithic network into sub-networks at joints satisfying
BCC 1, it follows that the resulting sub-networks satisfy the required assumption
1 for network borders also at their new borders.
When dividing a monolithic network satisfying network assumption 2 (that
routes are elementary) into sub-networks at joints satisfying BCC 1, the gen-
erated routes for the sub-networks will be disjoint and ”internal” either to one
or to the other sub-networks, and they will also satisfy network assumption 2
for the sub-networks. Furthermore, the union of the routes generated for the
sub-networks is the set of routes of the original monolithic interlocking system.
When the cutting interfaces also satisfy conditions BCC 2 and BCC 3, the
conditions for setting any route depends only on the status of the sole elements
belonging to the sub-network to which the route belongs, and therefore the dis-
joint union of the interlocking tables generated for the sub-networks constitutes
the whole interlocking table for the monolithic network.
Due to the above conclusions, the behaviour of the interlocking for the big
network is the sum of the behaviours of the interlocking systems for the sub-
networks. Only the train behaviour at the new borders is different. Due to the
fact that trains’ behaviour assumption 3 allows the materialization of trains in
the border elements of the interlocking systems for the sub-networks, our compo-
sitional approach to the monolithic network over-approximates the verification
of the safety property by allowing more trains to “materialize” in sections that
are not border of the monolithic network. Thus terminating our argument.
4 Experiments
In this section we present the results of applying our approach to a case study
invented for the sake of explanation and to a real world case study we adapted
from our group’s previous work: the Early Deployment Line (EDL) in the Danish
Signalling Programme. In Sect. 4.1 we describe our experimental approach, then
in Sect. 4.2 we describe and summarize the results obtained in the invented case
study, and the results for the (EDL) example are shown in Sect. 4.3.
4.1 Experimental approach
For each of the case studies, we put the method described in Sect. 3 in practice
by first obtaining sub-networks (in XML format) according to the divide strategy
explained in Sect. 3.2. Then for each sub-network, we use the RobustRailS ver-
ification tool described in [18,19,20] and Sect. 2.2 to generate a model instance
and safety properties, and then to verify that the generated safety properties
hold in the model.
We also use the RobustRailS verification tool to monolithically verify the
railway network (without decomposing it) such that we can compare verifica-
tion metrics for the compositional approach with verification metrics for the
monolithic approach.
While verifying each instance we measure (in seconds) the real time taken
to obtain the verification result and what was the total memory (in MB) used
by the verification tool. In addition we collect some statistics about the model
instances as presented in Table 1 and Table 2. Such statistics provide a basis
for complexity comparison and include: the number of linear and point sections
for each instance, the number of marker boards, routes, and the state space
dimension (in logarithmic scale).
All the experiments for both case studies have been performed on a machine
with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2667 @ 2.90Gz, 64GB RAM, and running
CentOS 6.6, Linux 2.6.32-504.8.1.el6.x86 64 kernels.
4.2 Mini-Tiny-Fork: A small case study
To illustrate and evaluate our approach we have devised a case study based
on existing networks from [18,19] inspired by the typical examples from real
world used in other studies about formal verification of railway interlocking
systems [5,7,9,22]. The used network, although invented, represents a realistic
case.
The case study is based on three networks: Mini, Tiny, and Fork. Mini is the
network shown in Figure 1 and it represents a typical pattern of a station found
on lines with small stations. Tiny, a network expressing a typical line pattern
between stations, is depicted in Figure 5, and Fork, a common network shape
for a terminal station, is depicted in Figure 6.
t
mb01 mb03
mb02 mb04
bd bu
Fig. 5: Tiny Network.
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Fig. 6: Fork Network.
These networks, when connected left to right in the respective order, form
an example of a monolithic network of a line with two stations: Mini and Fork,
connected by a single track: Tiny. We designate this network by the acronym
M ·T · F and show it (without labels) in Figure 7.
The M · T · F network can be used to compare the monolithic approach
described in Sect. 2 with the compositional approach described in Sect. 3 because
the border (bd,t) between Mini and Tiny, and the border (t,bu) between Tiny
and Fork are both satisfying the BCCs. Therefore, the M · T · F network can
be naturally divided into the three networks Mini, Tiny, and Fork according
to the method described in Sect. 3, hence allowing for a compositional analysis
that we will refer to as M+T+F.
butbd
Fig. 7: M ·T · F Network.
Table 1 shows the verification metrics for the compositional analysis M+T+F:
all metrics are obtained by summing the corresponding metrics for the sub-
networks, except for the memory usage, which is calculated as the maximum
memory usage of the sub-networks. The table also shows the verification metrics
for the monolithic analysis of the monolithic network M ·T ·F. In all cases the
verification tool succeeded to verify the safety properties using simple induction
(k-induction with k = 1). As it can be observed the verification time and mem-
ory usage of the compositional analysis M+T+F is, as expected, much better
than for the monolithic analysis of M ·T ·F: The verification time is five times
faster and the memory usage (204 MB) is more than three times less. Moreover,
if the verification for the sub-networks were run in parallel, our compositional
approach would achieve a running time of just 18 seconds. Even though memory
consumption would increase in this case, the parallelization would still use less
memory resources (the sum of individual memory usages: 391 MB) than the
monolithic case (759 MB).
Table 1: Verification metrics for the Mini-Tiny-fork case study.
Linears Points Signals Routes log10(|S|) Time Memory
Tiny 3 0 4 2 11 1 13
Fork 9 2 8 6 40 10 174
Mini 6 2 8 12 37 18 204
M+T+F 18 4 20 20 76 29 204
M ·T · F 14 4 16 20 76 145 759
We introduced faults in the model and ran the tool to find a counterexample
witnessing a safety violation. As expected the time taken to find the witness was
improved by the compositional analysis. Whereas M ·T ·F takes 6.6 hours using
20.7 GB, the compositional approach takes 40 minutes using 7.2 GB.
4.3 EDL: A real world case study
The EDL is the first regional line in Denmark to be commissioned in the Danish
Signalling Programme. The line spreads over 55 kilometres from the station in
Roskilde to Næstved’s station, and the statistics shown in Table 2 gives insight
on its composition.
We apply seven cuts to the network dividing it into eight sub-networks, each
corresponding to an EDL station. The result are six networks of fairly similar
complexity (Gadstrup, Havdrup, Herfølge, Tureby, Haslev, and Holme-Olstrup)
plus two more complex ones (L. Skensved and Køge). With such a division we
decompose the verification of the interlocking system for EDL into the separate
verification of the eight stations.
Table 2: Verification metrics for the EDL line.
Linears Points Signals Routes log10(|S|) Time Memory
Gadstrup 14 3 16 21 73 86 513
Havdrup 10 2 12 14 51 20 263
L. Skensved 20 4 22 28 101 223 1212
Køge 52 22 54 66 306 6581 9393
Herfølge 6 2 10 14 39 13 191
Tureby 6 2 10 14 39 12 180
Haslev 10 2 12 14 51 22 261
Holme-Olstrup 12 2 16 20 63 27 350
Compositional 130 39 152 191 682 6984 9393
EDL 116 39 138 191 682 22793 26484
As in the Mini-Tiny-Fork case study, the verification tool succeeded to verify
the safety properties for the eight sub-interlocking systems using simple induc-
tion (k-induction with k = 1) and the verification metrics show that for the
compositional analysis (see the table entry Compositional) the verification time
is approximately a third (taking approx. 2 hours) than for the monolithic analysis
(taking aprox. 6 hours).
Furthermore, the compositional analysis uses less than half of the memory
resources (9393 MB) because we only need as much as the maximum value of
memory used to verify each sub-interlocking. Such memory reduction is impor-
tant when checking real world interlocking systems where a single station with
a complex network may quickly exhaust the amount of memory available. As
already discussed, if run in parallel our compositional approach would achieve a
much better running time. Even though memory consumption would increase,
the parallelization would only use roughly half (the sum of the individual mem-
ory usages: 12363 MB) of the memory resources than the monolithic case.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a compositional method to address the safety verification of
railway interlocking systems of large size by means of formal verification tech-
niques. The method, built on top of tools providing support for efficient verifi-
cation of this kind of systems, is tailored to the characteristics of multi-station
interlocking systems, that is, systems that control a line connecting several sta-
tions.
The idea of our method is as follows: Multi-station interlocking systems ex-
hibit a good deal of topological locality, which is exploited to easily, and auto-
matically, decompose the layout in smaller chunks, easier to verify. Figures on
the time and memory consumption gains obtained have been given for a simple
example and for a large, real world case study, the EDL line in Denmark, show-
ing that this approach is a good first step in the direction of defining a general
compositional approach able to exploit as better as possible the inherent locality
present in models of the interlocking logics of large networks.
The presented method assumes some Border Cut Conditions to be fulfilled in
order to guarantee soundness. These conditions require that the cuts are made
such that each route of the full network and the overlap and flank protection
of that route are completely within one of the sub-networks after the decom-
position. More work is needed to identify other patterns and conditions that
identify a safe place to cut a network employing these features in sub-networks,
maintaining some possibility of compositional verification.
As evidenced in the results for the EDL line, and expected from the paral-
lelization theory, the gains of the method depend on the running time for the
largest sub-interlocking system resulting from the division step. Future works
should take into account such bottleneck either by applying it to suitable lines
(for instance big lines with stations with relative simple complexity), or by find-
ing better strategies to divide the interlocking systems, or both.
In general, a more systematic study is needed on which ways to cut a network
allow for compositional safety verification and which do not. We are currently
exploring the challenge to find a way to cut into sub-networks the layout of very
large stations, which tend to appear in terminal stations. In such case, due to
the intricacy of the routes allowing trains to traverse the many tracks of the
station, it is likely that finding a generic, automated, way to divide the network
in sub-networks will be difficult, but future solutions to such problem would
benefit from compositional approaches like ours.
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